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INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL
MARKETS SECTION
Securities Regulation in Japan: An Update
SHEN-SHIN Lu*
§ 1. INTRODUCTION
The Japanese overhauled their Securities and Exchange Law (S.E.L.)
in 1988' in order to accomplish the following goals: (1) liberalize and in-
ternationalize their securities market; (2) regulate the securities futures,
index, and option trade; (3) develop a healthier securities issue market;
(4) change disclosure regulations; (5) encourage investor trust in the fair-
ness of the Japanese securities market; and (6) reinforce the prevention of
"insider trading."' In 1992, Japan further amended the S.E.L. to extend
the restrictions on insider trading to the over the counter market as well
as listed securities.3 The 1992 amendments also created a Securities and
Exchange Surveillance Commission with authority to investigate securi-
ties law violations, but, unfortunately, its powers are limited to reporting
its findings to the Ministry of Finance." This article focuses on the re-
vised disclosure regulation and the effort to prevent insider trading ad-
dressed in the 1988 and 1992 amendments.
In 1988, the Japanese created an entirely new system of disclosure
regulations. The major changes were as follows: (1) three types of regis-
tration procedures, including a shortened form of the registration proce-
dure, whereas previously there was only one; (2) a new shelf registration
* Candidate for S.J.D., Harvard Law School; LL.M., Harvard Law School, 1991; LL.M.
Hitotsubashi University (Tokyo), 1989. This article is printed with the consent of Clark
Boardman Callaghan and will also appear in INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS AND SECURI-
TIES REGULATION.
1. Securities and Exchange Law No. 25 of 1948, amended by Law No. 75 of 1988.
2. WATARU HORIGUCHI, KAISEIHO No ZENPANTEKI KOSATSU [A General Study of the
Amendment], 806 KINYU SHOJI HANREI [FINANCIAL AND COMMERCIAL CASES] 7 (1988).
3. Securities and Exchange Law No. 25 of 1948, amended by Law No. 73 of 1992 [here-
inafter S.E.L.].
4. See infra § 4.02.
DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
system;5 (3) a shorter waiting period; (4) reinstatement of disclosure re-
quirements for secured bonds; (5) an increased offering amount exempt
from registration; (6) an extended requirement for filing current reports;
and (7) a required disclosure of segmental and geographic financial infor-
mation. In 1992, the Ministry of Finance (M.O.F.) also amended the Dis-
closure Rule (D.R.).8 These changes in the disclosure system are explored
below.
§ 2. NEW DISCLOSURE REGULATIONS
§ 2.01 Three Kinds of Registration
The Japanese disclosure system is similar in many respects to that
under the Securities Acts in the United States. An issuer must register
securities with the M.O.F. and prepare a prospectus for the investors if
the issuer wants to publicly offer securities.7 The issuer, underwriter, or
securities firm offering the securities must deliver a prospectus to the
purchasers of securities in a public offering." A public company must file
periodic reports (annual, semi-annual and current) with the M.O.F. as
well. 9 The registration statements relating to a securities offering and the
periodic reports constituting the continuous disclosure system require
some of the same information. Under the new system, companies that
have filed periodic reports for three years may file a simplified registra-
tion statement incorporating periodic reports.
Under the current law, there are three types of registration disclos-
ure: complete disclosure (kanzen kaizi), combined disclosure (kumikomu),
and reference disclosure (sansho), which is the simplest.
[1] Complete Disclosure
An issuer must file a registration statement with the M.O.F. before
publicly offering or selling securities if the amount offered exceeds 500
million yen (4.2 million U.S. dollars).10 Offerings of less than 500 million
yen are exempt from registration.11 Some securities are exempted - for
example, government and municipal bonds.12 The issuer must complete
and file Form 2 (Japanese companies) or Form 7 (foreign companies).13
Complete disclosure is the most burdensome type of registration.
5. 17 C.F.R. § 230.415 (1992) (Rule 415 of the U.S. Securities Act of 1933). See gener-
ally Cox, HILLMAN & LANGERVOORT, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 269
(1991); Louis Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 135 (1988).
6. Ministry of Finance Order No. 53 (1992) [hereinafter M.O.F.].
7. S.E.L., supra note 3, art. 13.
8. Id. art. 15.
9. Id. arts. 24, 24-5.
10. Id. art. 4 (based on an exchange rate of one U.S. dollar to 120 yen, which will fluctu-
ate with the market).
11. See infra § 2.05 for the procedures relating to offerings of less than 500 million yen.
12. S.E.L., supra note 3, art. 3.
13. Kaijirei [Disclosure Rule], art. 8 (1992) [hereinafter D.R.].
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[2] Combined Disclosure
A company that has been filing periodic reports for the previous
three years can use combined disclosure if the company wants to issue or
sell securities through a public offering.' " The issuer completes the regis-
tration form to include all events that have taken place since the filing of
the last periodic report. The issuer submits the registration form to the
M.O.F. with copies of the most recent annual, semi-annual, and current
reports. Combined disclosure enables the issuer to avoid duplicating in-
formation previously filed. The issuer must use either registration state-
ment Form 2-2 (Japanese companies) or Form 7-2 (foreign companies). 15
[3] Reference Disclosure
An issuer qualified for reference disclosure need only submit a list of
the previously filed reports and the location of the reports before issuing
or selling securities.' 6 This is the simplest registration format. The eligi-
bility criteria for reference disclosure are the same as those for shelf regis-
tration described below.' 7 The issuer must use either registration Form 2-
3 (Japanese companies) or Form 7-3 (foreign companies).' 8
§ 2.01 Shelf Registration System (Hako Toroku)
The two types of disclosure requirements that existed before the
1988 amendment - public offering registration disclosure and continuous
disclosure - remain. The new shelf registration system integrates these
two requirements, reduces the cost of issuing securities to large listed
companies, and enables companies to issue securities within certain time
periods, giving them the chance to select the most opportune time.
[1] Issuer's Qualification
In order to qualify to file a shelf registration, an issuer must satisfy
the following conditions: 9
1) the issuer must be a listed company and have filed disclosure re-
ports for the three previous years; and
2) the issuer's average stock trading amounts on exchanges in the last
three fiscal years must exceed 100 billion yen (830 million U.S. dollars),2 0
AND the average market value of its listed stock in the last three years
must exceed 100 billion yen; OR the average market value of its listed
14. S.E.L., supra note 3, art. 5; D.R., supra note 13, art. 9-2.
15. D.R., supra note 13, art. 9-2.
16. S.E.L., supra note 3, art. 5; D.R., supra note 13, art. 9-3.
17. See infra § 2.02[1].
18. D.R., supra note 13, art. 9-3.
19. S.E.L., supra note 3, arts. 5, 23-3; D.R., supra note 13, art. 9.
20. If the issuer's securities have been traded on an exchange for less than three years,
the average trading amount or market value of the longer period (one or two years) should
be used. M.O.F., supra note 6.
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stock in the last three years must exceed 500 billion yen (4.2 billion U.S.
dollars); OR the issuer must have issued bonds that constitute a secured
privilege payment under law;2 ' OR the issuer must have issued bonds that
are rated at least single A by one rating institution.2 2
[2] Filing the Shelf Registration
An issuer proposing to offer securities on a delayed basis can file a
shelf registration statement with the Ministry of Finance (M.O.F.). The
registration statement must state the planned issuing or selling period,
kind and price of the securities, and name of the major underwriter or
securities firm selling the securities.2 3 The registration must be on Form
11 (Japanese companies), or Form 14 (foreign companies), and include
the same information required by the reference registration.2 4
The registration becomes effective fifteen days after it is filed.2 5 The
M.O.F. can shorten the waiting period to seven days at the issuer's re-
quest.2" The planned offering or selling period must not exceed two years
after the effective date.2 ' The issuer may choose a one or two year pe-
riod. 28 If the issuer has issued or sold the planned amount before the ef-
fective period expires, the issuer must file a statement terminating the
shelf registration.2 9 The issuer may cancel the shelf registration anytime
by filing a cancellation statement.30 If the issuer is no longer listed on the
exchange, it is not eligible for the shelf registration and must file a cancel-
lation statement with the M.O.F.3 The shelf registration then loses effect
immediately.2 The issuer must also send copies of the cancellation state-
ment to the exchanges with which the issuer was listed.3
21. For example, both the Public Electricity Law and the Nippon Telephone & Tele-
gram Corporate Law authorize the power and telephone companies to issue bonds with se-
cured privilege payment. "Bonds with secured privilege payment" are bonds guaranteed by
the government.
22. In 1992, the M.O.F. adopted a rating system and designated Standard and Poor's,
Moody's, the Japan Investment Service, Japanese Bond Research Institution, and two other
organizations as acceptable rating organizations for this purpose. M.O.F. Bulletin, No. 131
(1992).
23. S.E.L., supra note 3, art. 23-3.
24. D.R., supra note 13, art. 14-2. See infra § 2.01[3] for a discussion of reference
registration.
25. S.E.L., supra note 3, arts. 8, 23-5.
26. Toriatsukai Tsudatsu [Administrative Guidance], arts. 8-1, 23-5-1 (1992) [hereinaf-
ter A.G.].
27. S.E.L., supra note 3, art. 23-6.
28. D.R., supra note 13, art. 14-5.
29. S.E.L., srupra note 3, art. 23-7.
30. A.G., supra note 26, art. 23-7-2.
31. Id. art. 23-7-3.
32. S.E.L., supra note 3, art. 23-7.
33. A.G., supra note 26, art. 23-7-4.
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[3] Amendments
After filing the shelf registration, the issuer must file an amended
registration statement with the M.O.F. under the following conditions:3 4
(1) the entire planned amount of securities cannot be issued in the
planned offering period;3 5
(2) the issuer selects a different underwriter or securities firm to sell
the securities; 6 or
(3) the issuer delays the effective date.3"
In addition, when the issuer deems any other change significant, an
amended registration should be filed. However, the issuer may not
amend the registration statement to increase the amount offered, change
the planned issuing period, or change the kind of securities.39 The M.O.F.
may suspend the shelf registration for up to fifteen days after the issuer
files an amendment if such action is necessary in order to protect public
investors.4
0
[4] Ordered Amendment
The M.O.F. may order the issuer to file a supplemental shelf registra-
tion statement, suspending the offering until the filing occurs.41 The filing
should be made on supplemental shelf registration Form 12 (Japanese
companies) or Form 15 (foreign companies).42
The M.O.F. can order the issuer to file additional documents if it
finds the issuer's statements are defective, misleading, or inconsistent
with the disclosures required by the appropriate forms.43 The M.O.F. may
also suspend the shelf registration or delay the effective date at any
time.4
4
§ 2.03 Shorter Waiting Period
Under the new law the waiting period has been shortened from thirty
days to fifteen days." This was possible because of the development of
34. S.E.L., supra note 3, arts. 23-4, 197, 200.
35. A.G., supra note 26, art. 23-4-2.
36. Id. art. 23-4-3.
37. D.R., supra note 13, art. 14-4. Since the registration becomes effective 15 days after
filing, the issuer may want to file a delaying amendment to postpone the effective date.
38. S.E.L., supra note 3, art. 23-4.
39. D.R., supra note 13, art. 14-4.
40. S.E.L., supra note 3, art. 23-5.
41. Id. art. 23-8.
42. A.G., supra note 26, art. 14-7.
43. S.E.L., supra note 3, arts. 23-9, 23-10. For example, additional documents would be
ordered if an issuer failed to include the name of the firm acting as underwriter or to submit
a list of the locations at which its disclosure reports are available. See supra § 2.01[3].
44. S.E.L., supra note 3, art. 23-11.
45. Id. art. 8.
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computer and communication technology, which has accelerated informa-
tion analysis. The M.O.F. can further shorten the period if the issuer's
information is readily available to the general public." Registration for an
issuer eligible to use reference disclosure can become effective seven days
after the filing."'
§ 2.04 Reinstatement of Disclosure Requirements for Secured Bonds
The registration requirements for issuing secured, legally guaranteed,
and preferred bonds were temporarily waived in 1953,48 but they exist
again under the new law. The reasons for the temporary waiver of the
registration requirement were as follows:4" (1) most of the secured bonds
were acquired by financial institutions; as a result, there was no need to
protect public investors; (2) these bonds were secured, or legally guaran-
teed, and were thus safer than other securities; and (3) the issuers of
these bonds continued to file periodic reports. It was unnecessarily bur-
densome for the issuers to file registration every time they wanted to is-
sue such bonds.
The reasons for reinstating registration requirements for such bonds
include the following: (1) the general public now purchases more than
half of these bonds; (2) deregulation under the Commercial Code now
means these bonds are no safer than unsecured bonds; and (3) the dis-
closure procedure has been simplified by the new law. As a consequence,
registration of secured bonds is required under the current law for the
protection of public investors with minimal burden on issuers.
§ 2.05 A Higher Issuing Amount for Registration Exemption
Under the old regime, an issuer had to file a registration statement if
the issuing amount exceeded 100 million yen (830 thousand U.S. dollars).
This had been the standard since the 1971 S.E.L. amendment.
As a result of inflation and currently large issuing amounts, 100 mil-
lion yen is no longer an appropriate threshold for imposing the burden
and cost of registration on issuers. Accordingly, the amount has been
raised to 500 million yen (4.2 million U.S. dollars).50 However, the issuer
still has to file a notification with the M.O.F. if the issuing amount ex-
ceeds 1 million yen (8.3 thousand U.S. dollars).5 1 If the issuing amount
exceeds 500 million yen, the issuer must file a registration statement. If
the amount is between 1 million and 500 million yen, the issuer has to file
a notification with the M.O.F. If the offering is for less than one million
46. Id.
47. A.G., supra note 26, art. 8-1.
48. Securities and Exchange Law No. 25 of 1948, amended by Law No. 142 of 1953,
supp. provision item 7 (Kaiseiho Fusoku 7).
49. Kakuro Kanzaki, "Kigyo Naiyo Kaiji Seido No Kaisei" ["Enterprise Disclosure
Amendments"], 806 KINYU SHOJI HANREI [FINANCIAL AND COMMERCIAL CASES] 24 (1988).
50. S.E.L., supra note 3, art. 4; D.R., supra note 13, art. 2.
51. S.E.L., supra note 3, art. 4; D.R., supra note 13, art. 4.
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yen, the exemption is self-executing.
§ 2.06 Expanded Requirements for Filing Current Reports
Under the old regime, an issuer who had a duty to file periodic re-
ports was required to file a current report under the following
circumstances.2
(1) There was a change of the issuer's parent or an important
subsidiary.
(2) There was a change of the major shareholder.
(3) An issuer met with a disaster.
(4) The issuer was issuing or selling securities other than bonds
abroad in amounts exceeding 100 million yen (830 thousand U.S. dollars).
Under the new amendment the amount has been increased to 500 million
yen (4.2 million U.S. dollars).
(5) A decision was made by a shareholders' meeting or by the board
of directors for private sale of securities, other than bonds, in amounts
exceeding 100 million yen. Under the new amendment the amount has
been increased to 500 million yen.
Under the new amendment, these requirements still exist," and
there are six additional circumstances under which an issuer must now
file a current report.
(1) A law suit has been filed against the issuer, and the alleged dam-
ages exceeds five percent of total assets, or the issuer has paid damages
equal to more than one percent of total assets as a result of a law suit.
(2) The board of directors signs a merger or a consolidation contract
that will increase or decrease the issuer's sales or total assets by more
than ten percent, or dissolve the issuer.
(3) The board of directors signs a contract for the purchase or sale of
the business or assets that will increase or decrease the issuer's sales or
total assets by more than ten percent.
(4) A change of the representative director occurs.
(5) The issuer's debtor or the guarantor of the debt defaults on a
debt instrument to any party (emphasis added), OR the debtor or guar-
antor is undergoing reorganization. Such default or reorganization, how-
ever, need be reported only if it might result in a default or delay in pay-
ing a debt to the issuer in an amount that is more than ten percent of the
issuer's total assets.
(6) Any event occurs that has a substantial effect on the issuer's fi-
nancial situation or business.
The new disclosure requirements benefit the public, which now has
52. S.E.L., supra note 3, art. 24-5.
53. Id.
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access to more accurate and up-to-date information about the issuer.
§ 2.07 Disclosure of Segmental Information
Full disclosure of business operations is required in both the initial
registration and periodic reports. The issuer must disclose total sales of
each product and quantities sold within the last two fiscal years. An is-
suer that exports most of its products overseas must disclose the import-
ing countries or areas and, for each product, the percentage of sales in the
respective country or area.
In addition to these requirements, under the new amendment, the
issuer must disclose (1) sales and profit or loss of each business, (2) sales
and profit or loss in different business locations, and (3) overseas sales."
Public investors thus have more information about the issuer's financial
performance.
§ 2.08 Penalties and Remedies
There is a three year imprisonment or fine of three million yen"5 (25
thousand U.S. dollars), or both, for filing an untruthful registration state-
ment.50 If the issuer continues to offer securities without filing a supple-
mental registration when ordered to do so, a one year prison term, a fine
of up to 1 million yen (8300 U.S. dollars), or both may be imposed.57 Any
issuer that fails to file a supplemental shelf registration when ordered to
do so and continues to offer or sell securities is liable to the person who
acquired the securities and sustained damage as a result. 8 If the M.O.F.
issues an order suspending the registration and the issuer does not obey
the order, the issuer faces a penalty of up to six months imprisonment or
a fine no greater than 500 thousand yen (4.2 thousand U.S. dollars), or
both.59
§ 2.09 Disclosure Summary
The new disclosure system integrates registration disclosure and con-
tinuous disclosure. It gives reporting companies that meet the criteria for
shelf registration flexibility to choose the best time to issue securities and
simplifies filing requirements for such companies. It also gives public in-
vestors more pertinent information relating to a company's finance and
business operations. The requirements for segmental and geographic re-
porting of specified financial information will also facilitate the efforts by
54. D.R., supra note 13, arts. 10, 14, 17.
55. S.E.L., supra note 3, art. 197.
56. Id. arts. 197, 202. S.E.L. Article 202 states: "A prison term and a fine may be im-
posed in parallel with one another on any person who commits any crime referred to in the
preceding five articles depending on the circumstances relating to such crime." Capital Mar-
ket Research Institute, S.E.L., 135 (1989).
57. S.E.L., supra note 3, art. 198.
58. Id. arts. 16, 23-12.
59. Id. art. 200.
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Japanese issuers to gain access to foreign capital markets, including the
United States. It should be noted, however, that the segmental and geo-
graphic reporting requirements in Japan are not as detailed as the re-
quirements of Regulation S-K in the United States.
§ 3. INSIDER TRADING
The 1988 and 1992 amendments included a well publicized effort to
prevent insider trading. The discussion below argues that this new devel-
opment is illustrative of the Japanese genius for maintaining the status
quo despite outward manifestations of reform - in fact, the law on the
books may never be realized in practice.
§ 3.01 Reasons for Reinforcing Insider Trading Regulations
There were three reasons for reinforcing the insider trading provi-
sions. First, because the Tokyo Stock Exchange is among the biggest
listed markets in the world in terms of market capitalization, the Japa-
nese want to build a fair trading market image. Since the creation of the
Securities and Exchange Law in 1948, almost no insider trading cases
have been exposed. The foreign media accuse Japan of being an "insider's
haven.""0 The Japanese want to rid themselves of this image. Second, the
prevention of insider trading is a world-wide trend. The United States
enacted the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 and the Insider Trad-
ing and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988.61 The latter Act was
under consideration at the time of .the adoption of the Japanese amend-
ment. The United Kingdom enacted the Company Securities (Insider
Dealing) Act of 1985 and the Financial Services Act of 1986. France, Ger-
many, and Switzerland also reinforced their insider trading regulations.2
Japan wanted to follow the trend in order to foster a new "fair trader"
image, thereby further boosting the already fantastic growth of its securi-
ties markets. Third, the Tateho case focused Japan's attention on insider
trading. As a result of this case, the Japanese government accelerated the
reform of insider trading provisions. 3
60. Akio Takeuchi, Insaida Torihiki Kisei No Kyoka [The Reinforcement of Insider
Trading Regulation], 1142 SHoJI HoMU [COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL] 3 (1988).
61. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(a)(2). Although the Insider
Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 had not yet been adopted, the Japa-
nese translated the bill and published it in their law journals. The Japanese found the
American insider trading provisions to be more strict than their own.
62. Kakuro Kanzaki, Naibusha Torihiki No Kisei Ni Kansuru Kakokuho No Doko
[Foreign Countries' Insider Trading Regulation Trends] 819 JURISUTO [JURIST] 79, 85-86
(1984) (Switzerland). The Germans created insider trading self-regulation in 1971, and
amended it in 1976 and 1988. Sakamoto, Sho Gaikoku Ni Okeru Kisei No Jokyo - Doitsu
[Foreign Regulations, Germany], 806 KINYU SHOJI HANREI [FINANCIAL AND COMMERCIAL
CASES] 78 (1988).
63. TAKEJI YAMASHITA, JAPAN'S SECURITIES MARKETS 253-54 (1989); Kawamoto,
Hokaisei Ni Itaru Keii [The Texture of the Amendment], 806 KINYU SHoJi HANREI [FINAN-
CIAL AND COMMERCIAL CASES] 98-100 (1988); David I. Sanger, Insider Trading, The Japa-
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Tateho is a listed company and a chemical manufacturer. In August
1988, the company suffered a loss of 24 billion yen (200 million U.S. dol-
lars) against capitalization of only 2.5 million yen (21,000 U.S. dollars)
because of speculation on the future bond market. On August 31, the
management notified its eight banks to come to company headquarters
for a conference, which was scheduled for the afternoon of September 1.
After Tateho's announcement of its loss on September 2, the price of its
stock dropped dramatically. Meanwhile, from August 11 to August 21, six
of Tateho's high-level managers, including three officers, sold shares. One
of these officers was "advised" by the Osaka Stock Exchange to return his
profit from the tainted trade because of his violation of Article 189 (now
Article 164) of the Securities and Exchange Law. Article 189 had been a
copy of Section 16(b) of the American Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
The Article requires corporate insiders to disgorge their short-swing prof-
its to their corporations.
One of Tateho's eight banks, Hanshin Sogo Bank, sold all of its
337,000 Tateho shares on September 1. According to the bank's manag-
ers, the sale verdict was made on the morning of the first, but there was
no connection with Tateho's conference that afternoon. Two of the top
ten shareholders also sold their shares during August, but neither of them
owned more than ten percent of the company's total shares. In all, sev-
enty-six stockholders sold over 20,000 shares each in August. According to
the Osaka Stock Exchange's investigation, these transactions had nothing
to do with confidential information. However, there are strong suspicions
to the contrary. 4
How did the bank manage to avoid a loss by selling all of its Tateho
shares? Japanese banks know their customers very well because they can
access their customers' inside information. For example, a bank always
checks its customer's financial and managerial activity through loans and
other financial services, usually holds its important customers' shares in
order to stabilize the relationship between them, and always monitors its
customers' accounts to oversee any unusual activity. Therefore, Hanshin
Sogo Bank may well have known about Tateho's financial crisis.
Why did so many shareholders sell their shares in August? Was there
nese Way, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 1988, at 1.
64. The following statement was made by the Osaka Stock Exchange:
The Osaka Stock Exchange has made every effort to investigate the true facts
related to the possibility of insider trading of Tateho stock. According to our
investigation, there is no evidence of insider trading. But we found trading
which might cause misunderstanding. We feel very sorry about this incident,
since it came right after our notification to all listed companies to monitor
insider trading. We strongly point out that insider trading is unfair and dam-
ages investors' confidence in securities markets. Triggered by this incident, we
want to make every effort to prevent the misuse of confidential information by
insider trading, and to protect the trustworthiness of trading markets. We also
hope listed companies, securities firms, and related persons will prevent insider
trading. Kawamoto, supra note 63, at 98-100 (Author's translation).
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any sign or rumor that made these shareholders act? These questions are
left unanswered. However, because the case was widely reported by the
Japanese press,65 the Japanese public became sensitized to the reality of
insider trading.
§ 3.02 The New Regimen
[1] Article 157
Article 157 prohibits any person in a securities, future, option, or in-
dex transaction, including future securities transactions on a foreign mar-
ket, from (1) employing any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud; (2)
making any untrue statement of a material fact or omitting to state a
material fact; or (3) using a false quotation to induce another person[s] to
buy or sell securities. Violations of this Article carry a penalty of up to
three years in prison or a fine of up to 3 million yen (25,000 U.S. dollars),
or both.61
Article 157 is similar to Rule 10b-5 adopted under the U.S. Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.67 Rule 10b-5 is a catch-all fraud provision in fed-
eral securities regulation, and it has been widely used in the United
States.6 In contrast to Rule 10b-5, Article 157 has seldom been used in
Japan. Like Rule 10b-5, Article 157 prohibits "any" person from doing
"any" fraudulent act in "any" kind of securities transaction. The 1988
amendment extends the Article's scope to trading in futures, options, and
indexes. The scope of this Article is very broad, and it can be applied to
any kind of security, whether listed, traded on the over-the-counter mar-
ket, held privately, or issued by governments or foreigners.
The reason this Article has not been used much is that its wording is
too vague and its scope too broad. The Article was substantially copied
from the United States and is very difficult to apply in a Japanese court.
Under the Japanese legal system, there is no jury at a criminal trial. The
judge decides both the facts and the law. To protect defendants, very
strict conditions are imposed upon the prosecution. A prosecutor must
65. Id.
66. S.E.L., supra note 3, arts. 197, 202. Article 197 provides a penalty of no more than
three years in prison, or no more than three million yen in fines, for the breach of Article
147. Article 202, however, reads, "Any person who has committed a crime as prescribed by
the proceeding five Articles may be confined to imprisonment with hard labour and fined
concurrently in consideration of circumstances." (emphasis added). Id., translated by THE
JAPAN SECURITIES RESEARCH INSTITUTE, JAPANESE SECURITIES LAWS 71 (1987). Nonetheless,
these Articles stand for the proposition that if the crime is serious, the defendant may be
punished by both prison and fines. CAPITAL MARKET RESEARCH INSTITUTE, S.E.L. 58 (1989).
67. KATSURO KANZAKI, SHOKEN TORIHIKIHO (Shinpan) [SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE LAW
(New Edition)] 612 (1987); TAKEO SUZUKI & ICHIRO KAWAMOTO, SHOKEN TORIHIKIHO
(Shinpan) [SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE LAW (New Edition)] 555 (1987); Louis Loss ET AL.,
JAPANESE SECURITIES REGULATION 192 (1983). Article 157 was designated as Article 58 before
the 1992 amendment.
68. ROBERT CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 309 (1986); Louis Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURI-
TIES REGULATION 726-29 (1988).
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prove the defendant's "intention" to commit the crime and "the definite
cause and effect" of the crime. A prosecutor is considered a very "high
authority" in Japan. Once a defendant is prosecuted, a guilty decision is
expected. If a prosecutor accumulates too many "not guilty" judgments,
s/he will be deemed incompetent. Because Article 157 does not specify
what kind of defendant conduct falls under its aegis, prosecutors are re-
luctant to use it for fear that failure will hurt prosecutorial reputations.
The Ministry of Finance itself stated that "the Article is too vague and
too broad. There is a limitation to its use in an insider trading case. ' ' 9
[2] Article 163
Article 163 was copied from Section 16(a) of the American Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.70 It requires a corporate insider (director, audi-
tor,7' or major shareholder who owns more than ten percent of the com-
pany's shares) to file a report with the Minister of Finance after purchas-
ing or selling company securities.
[3] Article 164
Article 164 was copied from Section 16(b) of the American Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.72 It requires a corporate insider to surrender short-
swing profits (made from the purchase and sale, or sale and purchase
69. SECURITIES BUREAU (OF THE M.O.F.), THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COUNCIL RE-
PORT, May 11, Showa 51 (1976). The report states, "In the United States, our Article 58's
[now Article 157] twin, Rule lOb-5, has been widely used and extended to insider trading
cases. However, it is very difficult for us to precisely define the scope of insider trading. If a
tippee should fall under this Article, that would be overreaching. Furthermore, the Article's
purpose is to prevent fraud. There is a limitation on expanding it to insider trading cases."
(Author's translation). See also KANZAKI, supra note 67, at 612; SUZUKI & KAWAMOTO, supra
note 67, at 555; TATSUTA, in Louis Loss ET AL., JAPANESE SECURITIES-REGULATION 192 (1983).
70. Wataru Horiguchi, Shoken Torihikiho Dai 189 Jo No Kenkyu [A Study of the Se-
curities and Exchange Law, Article 189] 39-6, IKYORONSO [HITOTSUBASHI UNIVERSITY RE-
VIEW] 641 (1958); SUZUKI & KAWAMOTO, supra note 67, at 556; TATSUTA, supra note 69, at
107. Article 163 was Article 188 before the 1992 amendment.
71. Commercial Code Article 273 requires that every company must have at least one
auditor to supervise the company's business operation. The auditor has the right to check
the directors' management. The auditor can ask the directors or other employees to submit
business reports and can check the business and property of the company. The auditor can
oversee the company's subsidiaries' business. The auditor can forbid the directors' doing
business if the auditor finds the directors' actions will harm the company. If litigation oc-
curs between the company and one of its directors, the auditor will represent the company.
The auditor cannot be a director of the company or its subsidiaries. If the auditor neglects
his duty, he bears responsibility for the company's harm. An auditor, like a director, is an
employee of a company. The auditor is not an independent, outside CPA. Only a big com-
pany (with capital over 0.5 billion yen ($4 million) or liability over 20 billion yen ($167
million)), or a listed company, is required to have an outside CPA auditor or an accounting
firm. Kabushiki Gaisha No Kansato Ni Kansuru Shoho No Tokurei Ni Kansuru Horitsu
[Commercial Code Special Law on Audit of Stock Companies] Article 2; S.E.L., supra note
3, art. 193-2.
72. See supra note 70. Article 164 was Article 189 before the 1992 amendment.
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within six months) to the company. If the company does not ask the in-
sider to surrender the profit, any shareholder can bring a stockholder de-
rivative suit against the insider to disgorge the profit to the company on
behalf of the company.
[4] Articles 163 & 164 in Tandem
Article 163 is a pure disclosure requirement. Article 164 uses this dis-
closure to make insiders return profits from insider trading. Article 164
contains the following provisions.
(1) If a corporate insider purchases and sells, or sells and purchases,
his company's securities within six months and makes a profit, the com-
pany can request the insider to return the profit to the company.
(2) Any shareholder can demand that the company ask insiders to
return profits to the company. If the company fails to ask insiders within
sixty days after the shareholder's demand, the shareholder can request
that insiders return short-swing profits to the company.
(3) If neither the company nor any shareholder requests the insider
to return the profit, the request right will expire two years after the in-
sider takes his short-swing profit.
(4) If the Minister of Finance, based on the insider's transaction re-
port, finds that any insider received profit from the short-swing transac-
tion, the Minister shall notify the insider. If there is no objection from
the insider, the Minister of Finance shall notify the company with the
insider transaction report. If the Minister of Finance knows that the in-
sider has already returned the short-swing profit to the company, the
Minister does not have to notify the company.
(5) If an insider denies his profit from the short-swing transaction, he
shall file an objection with the Minister of Finance within twenty days
after he receives the notification from the Minister.
(6) If an insider challenges the short-swing trading assertion with le-
gitimate grounds, the Minister of Finance may erase the allegation por-
tion of the statement that will be sent to the company.
(7) If the insider does not deny the short-swing profit, the Minister of
Finance shall make public the insider's transaction report thirty days af-
ter the Minister of Finance's notification to the company, and this dis-
closure shall last two years, until the date upon which the profit request
right expires. If the Minister of Finance knows the insider has returned
the profit to the company, the Minister will not make the report public.
(8) If a major shareholder was not a major shareholder at either the
time of the purchase or the time of the sale, the shareholder shall not fall
under the Article.
(9) The Minister of Finance shall set up a rule that provides a
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method of calculating the short-swing profit of the insider.3
The purpose of these Articles is to prevent corporate insiders from
trading on the basis of confidential information.7 ' These Articles do not
require proof that insiders have possessed and traded on confidential
information.
Article 164 is related to Article 163. After an insider reports to the
Minister of Finance, the Minister can ascertain whether the insider has
breached Article 164. If the Minister finds that an insider profited from a
short-swing transaction, he must notify the insider and his company and
make public the name of the insider. This notification should give the
company a chance to recover its loss. If the company does not ask the
insider to return the profit from the insider trading, the company's share-
holders can sue the insider and make him relinquish the profit to the
company. Although the Japanese copied both Articles from the Ameri-
cans after -the Second World War, the Japanese deleted Article 163 in
1953. The reason for this elimination was that the Article was not deemed
"effective." Perhaps it was too burdensome for the Ministry of Finance to
check the reports. 75 As a result, without Article 163's reporting duty, Arti-
cle 164 became worthless, thus the 1988 reform.
There was only one case brought under Article 164 before the 1988
73. The method is provided by Showa 63 (1988), No. 40 M.O.F. Ordinance, art. 6. First,
the profits are calculated by finding the difference between the two transaction prices, and
multiplying by the matching number of the shares. Any securities exchange tax and com-
missions are then subtracted. The matching number of the shares is the number of the
shares that are purchased and sold, or sold and purchased, within six months. For example,
Insider A sold 1,000 shares at a price of 5,000 yen per share and bought 1,200 shares at a
price of 3,000 yen per share within six months. The matching number is 1,000, so the profits
are 2,000 x 1,000 = 2,000,000 yen, minus tax and commissions.
Second, if there is more than one transaction, the first purchase should match the first
sale, or reverse. The rest of the transactions should be matched by the transaction order.
For example, insider B bought 1,000 shares at a price of 3,000 yen per share on July 10;
1,300 shares at a price of 3,200 yen per share on July 20; 900 shares at a price of 3,500 yen
per share on July 30. Then he sold 800 shares at a price of 6,000 yen on October 1; 1,600
shares at a price of 6,500 yen per share on October 11; 200 shares at a price of 6,300 yen per
share on October 21. The profits from the first set of transactions are 3,000 x 800 =
2,400,000 yen. The profits from the second set of transactions are (3,500 x 200) (3,300 x
1,300) (3,000 x 100) = 5,290,000 yen. The profits form the third set of transactions are
2,800 x 200 = 560,000 yen. The total profits are 8,250,000 yen, minus tax and commissions.
Third, if there is more than one purchase or sale in a day, the lowest purchase price or
the highest sale price should be used to calculate the first transaction. For example, if in-
sider C sold his shares twice in one day, the higher price of the securities should be used to
calculate the first transaction. If he purchased his company's securities twice in one day, the
lower price should be used to calculate the first transaction.
74. CLARK, supra note 68, at 295; Loss, supra note 68, at 542; KANZAKI, supra note 67,
at 618; SUZUKI et. al., supra note 67, at 556; SEIJI TANAKA & WATARU HORIGUCHI, KON-
MENTARU SHOKEN TORIHIKIHO [COMMENTARY ON THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE LAW] 713
(1990).
75. KANZAKI, supra note 67, at 621; SUZUKI et. al., supra note 74, at 557; TANAKA &
HORIGUCHI, supra note 74, at 713.
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amendment. 76 Togo was the founder and president of Shokusan Jutaku
Sogo Company. He bought 560 thousand Shokusan shares at a price of
479 yen per share on July 20, 1972. He sold thirty thousand shares on
September 14 and 530 thousand shares on October 2, 1972. He made a
net profit of over 1.1 billion yen. One of Shokusan's shareholders re-
quested that the company sue Togo to make him disgorge the short-swing
profit under Article 164. The shareholder who asked the company to sue
Togo is known as a "sokaiya. '7 7 A sokaiya is a shareholder who criticizes
the company's management at the annual general meeting, if the com-
pany does not pay to keep him quiet, or one who is paid by the company
to prevent other shareholders from speaking in the general meeting.
Many sokaiya belong to gangs called "yakuza. ' 7 1 In this case, the sokaiya
had attempted to blackmail Togo for a sum of money after Togo's short-
swing transaction, but Togo refused to pay. As a consequence, the sokaiya
requested that the company sue Togo under Article 164. Because the
sokaiya belonged to a very notorious criminal group, the company reluc-
tantly sued Togo. However, the case was settled out-of-court in December
1988. Togo had been found guilty of tax evasion in another case. The
76. TANAKA & HORIGUCHI, supra note 74; SUZUKI et. at., supra 74, at 557; KANZAKI,
supra note 67, at 621. There are three cases related to Shokusan Jutaku, concerning tax
evasion, bribery, and insider trading. Nihon (Japan) v. Togo, Saikosaibansho Saibanshu
(Keiji) 236 Go 179 [236 Supreme Court Reports (Criminal Law) p. 179] (tax evasion); Nihon
(Japan) v. Takata and others, Saikosaibansho Hanreishu Dai 42 Kan Dai 6 Go 861 [Su-
preme Court Reports, Volume 42, No. 6, p. 861] (bribery). Junji Abe, Shokusan Jutaku
Jikan Saikosaibansho Ketei Ni Tsuite [The Supreme Court Decision in Shokusan
Jutaku], 920 JURISUTO [JURIST] 4 (1988).
77. Isaacs writes: "In effect, the general meeting of shareholders merely approves man-
agement proposals ... [Sihareholders are not expected to question management, or express
any opinion . . . [T]he meetings are kept very short . .. [Ilt was the general practice of a
number of public companies to offer money and other benefits to a limited number of 'spe-
cialists' to ensure that they attended general meetings for the purpose of encouraging or-
derly proceedings and to support company management. . . . '[Sipecialists' could often
guarantee that there would be no disruption of the meetings, as they used violence and
other unlawful means of influence.... The 'specialists' who enjoyed the greatest reputations
had come from a yakuza background (organized syndicates of gangsters) or right-wing polit-
ical groups." He continues with an example: "In May, 1979, more than 500 shareholders
attended an annual general meeting of shareholders of a company listed on the Tokyo Stock
Exchange, 200 of whom were sokaiya taking up all the front row seating.... Not a single
speech or question was presented to management by the ordinary shareholders present, and
the meeting was wound up after 25 minutes." However, under a 1982 Commercial Code
amendment, companies are not allowed to pay sokaiya. Sokaiya have set up many "eco-
nomic study groups" to "study" companies' publicly disclosed documents. Sokaiya publish
"economic study" periodicals at very high prices. For example, a periodical of three or four
pages published once a month will cost a company 500,000 yen (about $3900). If a company
does not subscribe to the periodical, the sokaiya might buy one share of the company's
stock, attend the general meeting, and criticize the management violently. Issacs continues:
"A report in January 1984 that Sony's annual general meeting of shareholders took more
than 13 hours had a tremendously negative impact [on the company's image]." JONATHAN
ISAACS, JAPANESE SECURITIES MARKET 123-128 (1990); ARON VINER, INSIOE THE JAPANESE SE-
CURITIES MARKETS 91-92 (1988).
78. ISAACS, supra note 77.
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Japanese government confiscated Togo's property and he became insol-
vent. After the company found that it was impossible to make Togo dis-
gorge the profits from the tainted transaction, the case was tried in Tokyo
District Court - from 1974 until 1987! There is a question as to how the
shareholder, the sokaiya, could allege that Togo breached Article 164,
even though the Article 163 duty to report had been deleted in 1953. This
question remains unanswered. Nevertheless, Shokusan Jutaku was the
only Article 164 case brought between the. enactment of the Securities
and Exchange Law in 1948 and its 1988 amendment.
Article 163, as revived, requires that a corporate insider must file a
report with the Minister of Finance before the fifteenth day of the next
month, after the insider's purchase or sale of his company's securities. If
the transaction is executed by a securities firm, the report should be sub-
mitted to the securities firm by the insider. The securities firm then sub-
mits the report to the Minister of Finance on behalf of the corporate
insider.
[5] Exceptions to Insider Filing Under Article 163
The important exceptions to the insider filing provisions under Arti-
cle 163 include the following: (1) fractional shares and non-rounded units;
(2) employee securities purchase plans; (3) employee trust funds; (4)
stock-index future transactions; and (5) stabilizations under Article
125(3).79
[a] Fractional Shares and Non-rounded Units
A fractional share is a portion of stock that is less than one full share.
In contrast, a non-rounded unit is a unit of stock that contains several
shares but is not a full unit. Fractional shares and non-rounded units may
be created by a stock dividend, share split, or a reverse share split; but
non-rounded units could also be created in connection with a new issue.
The par value of most Japanese companies' stock is fifty yen (about
0.42 U.S. dollars), if the company was organized prior to 1981. Par values
were so low due to the hyper-inflation that occurred during World War II
and the post-war period. The low par value created a tendency for stocks
to trade at relatively low prices, and it is inconvenient for the stock ex-
changes to trade such small-value stocks. Under the 1981 amendment to
the Commercial Code, an older company's listed stock should be traded
in the form of units that contain several shares since the exchange rules
require that listed companies' stock should have a par value or unit par
value of more than 50,000 yen (about 420 U.S. dollars).80 Unlisted compa-
79. S.E.L., supra note 3, art. 163; Law No. 40 of 1988, Ministry of Finance Ordinance,
art. 4.
80. Law No. 74 of 1981, Fusoku [Supplementary Provisions], art. 15. Another reason for
raising the trading price was to block sokaiya because a non-rounded unit shareholder can-
not attend the shareholders general meeting. If a sokaiya wants to attend the meeting he
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nies can choose whether they want to use the unit system. The 1981
amendment also requires new companies to set up their stocks' par value
at 50,000 yen or greater. As a result, many older companies set up before
1981 use 1,000 shares as a unit in order to comply with the amendment
and to be in accord with the new companies' 50,000 yen par value. All
listed companies' stocks are traded in either shares or units. Therefore,
fractional shares and non-rounded units (i.e. with a unit par value of less
than 50,000 yen) are not allowed to be traded on the stock exchange.
Since fractional shares and non-rounded units are not easily liquidated,
there is little fear of insider trading, and insiders are exempted from the
duty to report.
[b] Employee Securities Purchase Plans
If a company has an employee securities purchase plan, a contract
with a securities firm to buy the company's securities on a well-planned
and regular basis, and if the purchase decisions are not based on a case-
by-case investment judgment, company insiders are not required to file
transaction reports. In these situations, there is a limitation of one million
yen for every employee in each purchase. If the purchase is over this
limit, insiders must file transaction reports.
[c] Employee Trust Funds
Conditions and limitations upon employee trust funds are the same
as those imposed upon employee securities purchase plans. Both em-
ployee securities purchase plans and employee trust funds are part of em-
ployee welfare programs. Purchases of employee welfare programs are in-
tended to raise pension funds, to improve the relationships between
employers and employees, and to give employees incentives to work hard.
There is little danger of insider trading because (1) the amount of each
employees' purchases is limited; (2) the purchases are executed by a third
party (securities firm or trust company) on a planned and regular basis,
and (3) the purchase decisions do not involve case-by-case investment
judgments. Such transactions are also exempted from a duty to report
because the government seeks to encourage employee stock purchase
programs.
[d] Stock-Index Future Transactions
A stock-index future transaction is based on the average price of
many stocks in the future - the stock-index future - and is considered
a package of all stocks. For instance, the "Stock Future 50" is an average
price of fifty kinds of different stocks' future prices on the Osaka Stock
Exchange. Since a stock-index future involves stock of so many compa-
nies, a price change of the stock of one company will not have a substan-
must buy a round unit (higher price), compared with the lower price of one share of non-
rounded unit. ISSACS, supra note 77, at 127.
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tial impact on the stock-index future. Even an insider who trades stock-
index futures that include his company's stock future price is exempted
from the duty to report.
[e] Stabilizations Under Article 125(3)
Securities stabilization is a policy designed to prevent a new-issue
stock price decline. In a securities stabilization, the issuer must disclose
to the general public that the company is under stabilization. There are
also many restrictions on the company's securities price and on the time
limit for the stabilization."' There is no fear of insider trading and insid-
ers are exempted from the duty to report.
[6] Scope of Articles 163 and 164
The scope of Articles 163 and 164 is limited to public companies,
which include listed companies and companies whose securities are
traded on over-the-counter (OTC) markets.8 2 Before the amendment,
there were different opinions about the scope of Article 164 because there
was no clear definition as to what kinds of securities fell under the Arti-
cle. The amendment ended this disagreement. As a result of the amend-
ment bringing future and option transactions within the Article, the se-
curities covered include stocks, convertible bonds, bonds with warrant,
warrants, options, and future transactions of the securities described
above. If a corporate insider does not file a report required by Article 163,
or files a false report, or if an insider makes a false objection under Arti-
cle 164, there is a fine of up to three hundred thousand yen (2,500 U.S.
dollars)."8
Some argue that an astute major shareholder can evade Article 164
by selling his securities twice. For example, if a shareholder has 10.2 per-
cent of a company's shares, he can sell 0.3 percent of the company's
shares and return the short-swing profit to the company. Then he can sell
the rest of the 9.9 percent of the company's shares without returning the
short-swing profit to the company. It is true that the major shareholder
can evade Article 164, but one must consider its legislative purpose. Since
it is very difficult to prove that an insider traded on confidential informa-
tion, this Article uses a very objective standard - ten percent of the com-
pany's securities - to settle the threshold of proof. Any shareholder who
owns more than ten percent of a company's securities falls under Article
164. As long as s/he is no longer a major shareholder, s/he is outside of
81. TANAKA & HORIGUCHI, supra note 74, at 562-72; SUZUKI et. al., supra note 67, at
535-48; KANZAKI, supra note 67, at 639-56.
82. In the 1988 amendment, only listed companies' insiders were subject to these two
articles. Many commentators argued that the scope was too narrow. In the 1992 amend-
ment, insiders of companies whose securities are traded on OTC markets were included. See
Shen-Shin Lu, Are the 1988 Amendments to Japanese Securities Regulation Law Effective
Deterrents to Insider Trading?, 1991 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 179, 224.
83. S.E.L., supra note 3, art. 205.
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the restriction of Article 164. However, if any shareholder commits fraud
or makes a false statement, s/he falls under Article 157.
[7] Article 165
Article 165 prohibits any corporate insider from short-selling his
company's securities.8 4 Short-sales are legal in Japan, but short-sales will
accelerate securities price decline in a falling market. The Securities and
Exchange Law does not preclude everyone from short-selling. There are
some Ministry of Finance and stock exchange rules to restrict exchange
members, usually broker/dealers, from short-selling.85 However, corporate
insiders are not allowed to short-sell because they can access confidential
information. For example, suppose a company has a loss, and before the
information is disclosed, the insiders short-sell the company's securities.
They then buy securities for the settlement at a lower price after the dis-
closure of the bad news. The insiders can take advantage of their trading
counterparts by trading on confidential information. Short-sale by insid-
ers is a kind of insider trading.
Before the 1988 Amendment, Article 190 (now Article 165) read: "A
listed company's officers and major shareholders shall not sell their com-
pany's stock, if they do not have their stocks." ' The content of the Arti-
cle was not clear. If a major shareholder did not have shares of a com-
pany, how could s/he be the company's major shareholder? The Article
could also have been interpreted to mean that if an officer or a major
shareholder had only one share of company stock, s/he could short-sell
84. Article 165 was Article 190 before the 1992 Amendment.
85. Yukashoken No Karauri Ni Kansuru Kisoku [Securities Short-Sale Rule], Showa 23
(1948); Shoken Torihiki Iinkai Kisoku 16 [Securities and Exchange Commission Regulation
16]; Tokyo Stock Exchange Gyomukitei [Operational Rules] Article 72; Osaka Stock Ex-
change Gyomukitei [Operational Rules] Article 70. These rules define "short-sale" as a
transaction in which either a stock exchange member or his client does not possess the se-
curities, and the member borrows securities for settlement of the client's account. Securities
future trading, margin trading, and issue-day settlement trading are excluded from the
scope of short-sale. The rules require stock exchange members to state whether a transac-
tion is short-sale or not. The sale price cannot be lower than the last sale price. An exchange
member must state that a transaction is a short-sale unless the following apply: (1) he
knows that he or his client has the securities and there is no inconvenience or expense in
delivering the securities promptly; (2) he has the securities in the client's account or will
receive the securities in a pending transaction; or (3) he bought the securities in the same
exchange but the settlement has not been completed. These rules are copied from Rules 3b-
3, 10a-1, and 10a-2 of the U.S. Securities Exchange Act of 1934. However, there are small
differences. For example, U.S. Rule 10a-1 requires that the short-sale price cannot be lower
than the two last sale prices, while the Japanese rules only require that the price cannot be
lower than the last sale price.
86. The Japan Securities Research Institute translated Article 190 (now Article 165),
before the 1992 Amendment, as follows: "No officer nor major shareholder of a corporation,
the shares of which are listed for trading on a securities exchange, shall sell such portion of
the same shares as he does not actually have." JAPANESE SECURITIEs LAWS 64 (1987). "[Sluch
portion of the same shares" should read "such stock." The ambiguity of the Article is
manifest.
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any amount of the company's stock.
In order to clarify the content of the Article, the amended Article
reads "[a] listed company's officer/major shareholder shall not (a) sell his
company's securities, when he has less 'value' of the same class of the
securities than the securities he wants to sell; or (b) put or call an option
of sale of his company's securities, when he has less 'value' 7 of the same
class of the securities than the securities he wants to sell." Since future
and option transactions are now within the Article, the "securities" in-
clude stocks, convertible bonds, bonds with warrant, and warrants. As
some of the securities do not have prices, the Article uses "value" to eval-
uate prices of securities.
To illustrate, although a class of stock has a price on the daily stock
exchange, a conversion right of a convertible bond or a warrant does not
have a price. Even if a stock has a price every day, the price will change
drastically in a fluctuating market. It is very difficult to determine the
value of the right of a convertible bond or warrant because no one can
prejudge whether or not the right will be executed. If not, the right is
worth nothing. Similarly, an option that is not exercised is worth nothing.
The method of calculating the value of such securities is promulgated by
a Ministry of Finance ordinance.
Article 165 does not prohibit insiders from doing future transactions
because insiders can future-trade as a way of risk hedging. As a result, the
Article precludes a public company's insiders from selling or putting/call-
ing a sale option worth more than the value of the securities they hold,
and if they sell or put/call a sale option worth more than the value of the
securities they hold, they fall under this Article because they have sold
short. There is a fine of up to three hundred thousand yen (2,500 U.S.
dollars) for breach of this Article. 8
[8] Article 166
[a] Introduction
Articles 166 and 167 were added by the 1988 amendment.8 9 Article
157, the general anti-fraud provision, is too vague and too broad to be
used in an insider trading case. The Japanese wanted to clarify the con-
cept of insider trading and to make it illegal. These Articles describe who
is an insider and what kind of act shall fall under insider trading provi-
sions. They constitute the first Japanese laws that clearly prohibit insider
trading since the Securities and Exchange Law was created in 1948. Arti-
87. S.E.L., supra note 3, art. 165.
88. Id. art. 205.
89. The Japanese created these two articles as Articles 190-2 and 190-3 in 1988. The
numbers were changed to Articles 166 and 167 in 1992. The substance of these Articles has
not been changed by the 1992 Amendment. However, since there was much criticism from
many commentators, the scope of the Articles was enlarged to include public companies,
compared with only listed companies in the 1988 Amendment. See Lu, supra note 82.
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cle 166 prevents "corporate-related parties" and "primary tippees" from
insider trading, while Article 167 regulates them in the case of a tender
offer. These Articles have the same content; the only difference is that
Article 166 covers ordinary securities transactions, while Article 167 cov-
ers tender offers.
[b] Proscriptions
Article 166 prescribes that if "corporate-related parties" know the
"material facts" of an issuer's business, the parties shall not purchase or
sell the issuer's securities until the "material facts" are disclosed. This
Article also prescribes that any person, a "primary tippee," who directly
knows the "material facts" of an issuer from the "corporate-related par-
ties," shall not purchase or sell the issuer's securities until the "material
facts" are disclosed. The securities covered by this Article include a pub-
lic company's stocks, bonds, warrants, and options.
[c] Definitions of Terms
[i] Corporate-Related Parties
"Corporate Related Parties" include:
(a.) an issuer's director, auditor, agent, or employee who knows the
issuer's business' "material facts" through his work;
(b.) an issuer's shareholder who has the right to examine the issuer's
books and records under Commercial Code Article 293-6, and knows the
issuer's business' "material facts" through exercise of the right;90
(c.) a person who has the legal right to oversee, or has authority over
the issuer, and knows the "material facts" of an issuer's business through
exercise of the right or authority;
(d.) a person who has a contract with the issuer and knows the is-
suer's business' "material facts" because of the contract; or
(e.) an officer of any entity employing persons in categories.(a.) and
(b.) above, if such officer has learned of any material fact in connection
with the performance of his duties.
The "corporate-related parties" remain subject to this Article for a
period of one year after they have terminated their duties, employment,
or contracts.
Under this Article, people in categories (a.) and (b.) are "insiders,"
while those in categories (c.) and (d.) are "quasi-insiders." Category (a.)
includes everyone who has connections with the issuer. Even a part-time
worker who cleans the issuer's office may fall under this Article. Category
(b.) includes the shareholder's agents or employees, if they exercise the
90. A shareholder who has over ten percent of his company's stock can ask the com-
pany to let him examine or copy the company's books and records. SHOHO [COMMERCIAL
CODEI, art. 293-6.
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examination right. If the shareholder is a company, and one of its direc-
tors, auditors, agents or employees exercises examination rights, s/he may
fall under this Article. A secondary party who knows the issuer's "mate-
rial facts" from any person who exercises the examination right in such a
company may fall under this Article.
To illustrate, X company is a major shareholder of Y company. X's
employee Z exercises the examination right to learn Y business' "material
facts." Instead of taking advantage of the information himself, Z tells W,
another of X's employees, the "material facts," and W does the insider
trading. W will fall under this Article. In this case, W is also a "primary
tippee." Category (c.) includes all persons who can examine, license, or
have authority over the issuer, for example a government bureaucrat who
receives the issuer's application for producing a very effective anti-AIDS
medicine, or who receives an issuer's application for registering its new
patent, or a Ministry of Finance officer who just examined the issuer's
books or records. Category (d.) includes all persons who have contracts
with the issuer, such as the issuer's attorneys, accountants, bankers, and
underwriters. For example, a printing company that has a printing con-
tract with the issuer, or an interpreting company that sends interpreters
to the issuer would both be controlled by this Article. If the entity that
has a contract with the issuer is a company, the conditions stated in cate-
gory (b.) will apply - the company's directors, auditors, agents, employ-
ees, and their primary tippees will fall under this Article. For example, X
securities firm is the underwriter of issuer Y. Z, one of X's employees,
knows the "material facts" of Y's business through the underwriting con-
tract. Z passes this confidential information to W, and W does the insider
trading. W falls under this Article.
[ii] Primary Tippee
Any person who receives the "material facts" of an issuer's business
directly from the "corporate-related parties" is a "primary tippee." Arti-
cle 166 prohibits any "primary tippee" from trading the issuer's securities
before the "material facts" of the issuer's business are disclosed. This re-
striction is effective within one year after the "corporate-related parties"
have terminated their duties, employment, or contracts. For instance, X
company's former employee Z, out of his job for ten months, knows the
"material facts of Y's business through his former work; Z tells his friend
W the confidential information and W trades Y's securities before Y's
disclosure of the "material facts;" Z falls under this Article. However, if
W received the confidential information within one year of Z's termina-
tion but traded one year after Z's termination, W does not fall under this
Article.
According to the Ministry of Finance's explanation,91 the reason this
91. Akio Takeuchi, Insaida Torihiki Kisei No Kyoha [The Reinforcement of Insider
Trading Regulation], 1144 SHoJI HoMu [COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL] 9, 15 (1988). Professor
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Article prevents only "primary tippees" from insider trading is to make
the scope of the Article clear. If all tippees fell under the restriction, no
manageable limits would exist. For example, in the case above, if W, in-
stead of taking advantage of the confidential information by himself, told
M, then M told N, and N did the insider trading before Y's disclosure, W,
M and N are all tippees. It is impossible to restrict all tippees because
anyone could be called a tippee. To narrow this Article's scope, only "pri-
mary tippees" are prohibited from insider trading.
[iii] Material Facts
"Material Facts" include the following:
(a.) Management decisions relevant to the execution of the following
matters:
(1) issue of stocks, convertible bonds, and bonds with warrants;
(2) capital reduction;
(3) share splits;
(4) dividends;9 2
(5) mergers or acquisitions;
(6) disposing of all or a part of the company's business; as well as
acquiring all or part of another company's business;
(7) dissolution;9
(8) bringing a new product or new technology into the market; or
(9) entering into a joint venture, or other matters similar to (1) - (8)
above which are prescribed by ordinance.
(b.) When any of the following happen:
(1) a disaster, or other damage occurs to the company;
(2) a change of a major shareholder;
(3) an event which will unlist the company; or
(4) any events, like (1) - (3) above, that are prescribed by ordinance.
(c.) A new estimate indicating that the company's sale, ordinary prof-
its, or net profits will be different from the previous estimate, as this new
estimate may have an impact on the investor's judgments.
(d.) In addition to (a.) through (c.), any important facts about the
Takeuchi is the Chairman of the "Unfair Trading Special Department" of the Securities
and Exchange Council. The Securities and Exchange Council is an advisory council in the
Securities Bureau. The Unfair Trading Special Department consists of five scholars, one
bureaucrat of the Justice Department, one Tokyo Stock Exchange assistant director, one
drug company president, one president of a securities research firm, one trustee of an eco-
nomic study fund, and a director of a Japanese economic newspaper.
92. Only if the management decides to change the amount or the method of the preced-
ing dividend does this decision fall under the scope of "material facts."
93. The only exception is dissolution by merger.
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company's operation, business, or property that will have an impact on
investor judgment.
[d] Disclosure of Material Facts
There is a disclosure of material facts if:
(a.) the company complies with an ordinance to make "material
facts" public, or
(b.) the company files a statement or a report under Article 25."'
An order of the M.O.F 5 requires a company to publicize material
facts in at least two forms of mass media. Disclosure is complete twelve
hours after the publication. The mass media include a national daily pa-
per, a national industry or economic newspaper, or a national radio or
television broadcast. The twelve hour requirement commences with the
publication in the second medium.
[e] Exceptions
The following persons, securities, and transactions are beyond the
scope of this Article:
(a.) a person who obtains stock by exercising a warrant;
(b.) a person who obtains stock by exercising his conversion right
under a convertible bond;
(c.) a person who trades securities to complete his mandatory obliga-
tion or requests the issuer to buy his shares under the Commercial
Code;9
6
(d.) a person who follows a decision of the board of directors to buy
securities against a tender offer;
(e.) a person who trades securities under a stabilization that is regu-
lated by an ordinance; 97
(f.) a person who trades bonds or options on bonds, unless these
94. S.E.L., supra note 3, art. 165-2. Under Article 25, the Ministry of Finance must
make public the company's disclosure document for a special period of time - for example,
five years for annual and supplemental reports.
95. S.E.L. Operation Order, art. 30, 1 1.
96. Appraisal Right: under the Commercial Code a shareholder can ask the issuer to
buy his shares in the following circumstances: (1), if a shareholder opposes the issuer's im-
portant managerial decision, such as disposing of an important property, he can ask the
issuer to buy his shares (Article 245-2); (2) if the issuer decides to make restrictions on the
qualification of its shareholders, any shareholder who opposes this decision can ask the is-
suer to buy his shares (Article 349). However, this situation should not arise, because once
the issuer makes this decision, its securities will be removed from the list or the OTC mar-
ket and only a public company is within the scope of Article 166; or (3) a shareholder can
ask the issuer to buy his shares if s/he opposes the issuer's merger decision (Article 408-3).
97. A stabilization is a way of preventing a sharp price drop of a newly issued security
under the supervision of the Ministry of Finance. TANAKA & HORIGUCHI, supra note 74, at
749; SUZUKI et. al., supra note 67, at 595; KANZAKI supra note 67, at 639.
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bonds or options come with warrants or conversion privileges;
(g.) a transaction among insiders and primary tippees not on an over-
the-counter market or a stock exchange;9 s
(h.) an execution of a securities transaction by the issuer; either the
transaction had been decided/contracted before the "material facts" hap-
pened or other similar transactions that are prescribed by an ordinance.
[9] Article 167
Article 166 prohibits any insider, quasi-insider, or primary tippee
from insider trading in an ordinary securities transaction, while Article
167 prohibits them from insider trading in the case of a tender offer. Arti-
cle 167 has almost the same content as Article 166. The only difference
between these two Articles is that the term "material facts" in Article 166
is replaced by the term "tender offer facts" in Article 167. Under Article
167 no insider, quasi-insider, or primary tippee of the offeror can buy or
sell the target company's securities if he knows the offeror has made a
decision to execute or withdraw a tender offer. The concept of insiders,
quasi-insiders, and primary tippees is the same as that in Article 166. The
exceptions to Article 167 are the same as those to Article 166.
[101 Article 154
Article 154 gives the Minister of Finance the right to order both the
stock exchanges and listed companies to file reports about their business
or properties or to submit documents. The Article permits the Minister to
examine only the stock exchanges' business, properties, books, and
records, not the listed companies'. Before the amendment, the Minister
had the right to order or examine only the stock exchanges. The new law
gives him the additional right to order listed issuers to file reports. 9"
§ 4. THE 1992 AMENDMENT: SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE SURVEILLANCE
COMMISSION
§ 4.01 History of the Law Reform
The Unfair Trading Special Department ' "0 (hereinafter, the Depart-
ment) of the Securities and Exchange Council in M.O.F. was set up in
1987. It began major reform against insider trading in 1988. As a result of
the creation of this agency, the Japanese hoped additional securities
98. There is no danger of abuse of confidential information among insiders and pri-
mary tippees because they all know the confidential information. However, in this case, if
the seller knows the buyer would resell these securities to a third party, the seller should not
sell the securities to the buyer. For instance, A and B are both insiders or primary tippees.
If A knows that B would resell the securities bought from A to C, an outsider, A should not
sell B the securities because B would take advantage of C by using confidential information.
S.E.L., supra note 3, art. 166.
99. Telephone interview with Wataru Horiguchi by the author, February 1, 1993.
100. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
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problems could be addressed. One such scandal occurred in July of 1991,
when the "Big Four" (Nomura, Daiwa, Nikko and Yamaichi) securities
houses illegally compensated their large clients. 1 Nomura Securities and
Nikko Securities were also found to have manipulated the stock price at a
railway company on behalf of an organized crime boss.'0 2 Following this
chain of events, the presidents of Nomura Securities and Nikko Securities
resigned.'03 Subsequently, a top aid to Finance Minister Hashimoto re-
signed after admitting he had helped arrange a loan-fraud scandal0"
worth U.S. $93 million. Following this, the Minister of Finance himself
resigned. 0 5
In an attempt to consider the impact on U.S. investors and markets,
the S.E.C. sent queries to Japanese securities firms regarding the stock
scandal. 06 Two large U.S. pension funds also reacted by sending notice to
the Big Four to request reforms of the Japanese brokers."0 ' The extent of
this outside pressure forced the Japanese Prime Minister to commence
with financial reform.' Many scholars criticized the abolition of the U.S.
S.E.C.-style regulator that was imposed after W.W.II.109 The Japanese
business leaders, after all of the aforementioned scandals, strongly urged
their government to set up an American S.E.C.-type of independent se-
curities watchdog." 0 The Prime Minister responded by asking the M.O.F.
to propose establishing a new institution that would oversee the securities
markets as well as the securities industry. The M.O.F. then submitted a
proposal for the "Securities and Exchange Surveillance Commission" to
be designed within the M.O.F., despite the fact that an independent insti-
tution outside of the M.O.F. was demanded by the Administration Re-
form Council."' The M.O.F. did not want to give up its power.
The Japanese also adopted the "honest" and "fair" principles recom-
mended by the International Organization of Securities Commissions
101. Christopher J. Chipello & Masayoshi Kanabayashi, Japan's 'Big Four' Firms Try
to Cool Payment Furor, WALL ST. J., July 30, 1991, at A13.
102. Clay Chandler, Tokyo is Scrutinizing Allegation of Nomura Stock Manipulation,
WALL ST. J., June 27, 1991, at All.
103. Trapped in the Rubble, THE EcONOMIST, June 29, 1991, at 65.
104. Top Japanese Aid Quits in Loan Scandal, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 4, 1991, at 14.
105. Quentin Hardy, Hashimoto's Exit, New Securities Laws Are Just A Drop in Ja-
pan Reform Bucket, WALL ST. J., Oct.. 4, 1991, at A10.
106. Michael R. Sesit et* al., SEL Sends Queries to Japanese Firms on Stock Scandal,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 1, 1991, at Cl.
107. Kathryn Graven, Pension Funds Ask Japanese Brokers To Make Reform, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 5, 1991, at B6a.
108. Chuck Freadhoff, Japan Scandal May Hasten Financial Reform, INVESTOR'S
DAILY, Aug. 7, 1991, at 1; Weisman, Scandals Prompt Kaifu Offer Securities Reform, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 8, 1991, at A6.
109. Lu, supra note 82, at 235.
110. Japanese S.E.C. Is Urged, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 1991, at Dll.
111. Shaken Torihikiho Kanshi linkai No Hasoku [The Start of the Securities and
Exchange Surveillance Commission], 470 TEGATA KENKYU [BILL STUDY] 70 (1992).
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(I.O.S.C.O.) in 1991.12 The new amendment binds securities firms and
their employees to be honest and fair with their clients at all times. The
securities firms were then prohibited from offering any compensation to
clients, and the penalties for this were raised in the new amendment." 3
§ 4.02 The Securities and Exchange Surveillance Commission
The Securities and Exchange Surveillance Commission (S.E.S.C.)
consists of three commissioners with one serving as the chair." 4 The com-
missioners are appointed by the Minister of Finance after gaining the ap-
proval of both chambers in the Diet."5 Their term is three years and can
continue by reappointment."' The commissioners cannot be dismissed
against their will." 7 The S.E.S.C., including these commissioners, pres-
ently employs 118 people.
The Minister of Finance's right to ask for reports under Article 154 is
delegated to the S.E.S.C.." s The S.E.S.C., as structured, has the right to
investigate all securities crimes, including insider trading and market ma-
nipulation." 9 The S.E.S.C. can subpoena information of individuals, as
suspects or as witnesses, to assist in its investigations.2 0 The Securities
and Exchange Surveillance Commission also has the power to check items
in the possession of the suspect, when actually questioning him, but can-
not similarly examine items in the possession of a witness.'2 ' The S.E.S.C.
cannot search the suspect's office or home without a court warrant be-
cause Article 35 of the Japanese Constitution requires a warrant in order
to conduct a search. If necessary, the S.E.S.C. can request the courts to
issue warrants for searches and to have access to property to confiscate
relevant evidence.'22 The S.E.S.C. also can request information and coop-
eration from other government departments.2 3 The S.E.S.C., in other
words, investigates all facets of the securities firms and self-regulation
organizations. 2 4
The S.E.S.C. must report to the M.O.F. when the S.E.S.C. discovers
illegal activities.2 5 The S.E.S.C. does not have the power to discipline one
who violates the laws or to initiate a proceeding. The S.E.S.C. can only
112. S.E.L., supra note 3, art. 49-2.
113. Id. arts. 50-3, 199, 207.
114. Okurasho Sechiho [Ministry of Finance Establishment Law] art. 10 [hereinafter
MOFEL].
115. Id. art. 11.
116. Id. art. 12.
117. Id. art. 13.
118. S.E.L., supra note 3, art. 154-2.
119. Id. art. 210.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. art. 211.
123. Id.
124. Id. arts. 55, 56, 79-14, 79-15.
125. Id. art. 226.
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advise the Minister of Finance.12 The Minister, then, is expected to give
serious consideration to the S.E.S.C.'s advice. 2 The S.E.S.C. can follow
up with a request for the report on any action taken by the Minister of
Finance after the S.E.S.C. recommendations have been given. ' 28 The
S.E.S.C. then can make further suggestions to the Minister of Finance.1 2 9
Given the Japanese cultural norms, the S.E.S.C. cannot be expected to
act independently or to challenge the M.O.F. in the event the M.O.F.
does not follow the S.E.S.C.'s recommendations. This new watchdog,
which is under the aegis of the M.O.F. and has a position similar to an
inside council, observes, investigates, and reports, but it does not have the
teeth to bite into the securities market.
§ 5. CASES AFTER THE 1988 AMENDMENT.
Since the 1988 Amendment, there have been two major cases related
to Article 164's short-swing profit. In these cases, the insiders either re-
turned the short-swing profit privately or were ordered to do so by the
court. 30 There also have been two Article 166 (insider trading) cases. In
the first Article 166 case, the Tokyo District Court fined a president of a
finance company 200,000 yen (1,667 U.S. dollars) by summary judgment
for breach of Article 166 in September 1990."' The second case, the
Macros Case, 2 2 was decided by Tokyo District Court in 1992. Here the
defendant, who was the director of a listed company, "window-dressed"
the company's sales and sold the company's stock before the scheme was
exposed. He made a profit of 18,000,000 yen (150,000 U.S. dollars), but
was later fined 500,000 yen (4,167 U.S. dollars) with no prison sentence,
despite the fact that the Court found him extremely malicious
(akushitsu). The court fined him without further penalty because he had
donated half of the profit to a pro bono legal service and he had suffered
enough social sanction. 133
These new insider trading laws obviously carry too light of a penalty.
Also of import is the point that in Japan, defendants will not be sen-
tenced to imprisonment unless they have a previous criminal record."3 4
The new law, therefore, is not an effective deterrent to insider trading.
§ 6. PROBLEM AREAS
The 1988 and 1992 amendments reinforce the proscription upon in-
126. MOFEL, supra note 114, art. 19.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. art. 20.
130. Lu, supra note 82, at 206.
131. News, 1229 SHoJI HOMU [COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL] 130 (1990).
132. Makuros No Insaida Torihikijiken Hanketsu [Macros Insider Trading Judg-
ment] 1306 SHoJI HoMu [COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL] 27 (1992).
133. Tokyo District Court Judgment, Sept. 25, 1992.
134. Lu, supra note 82, at 231.
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sider trading, but some important problems have not been solved.
§ 6.01 Bribes to Politicians
In the gift-giving society, important politicians receive scores of invi-
tations to many kinds of ceremonies every day. Their aides send flowers,
money, or other gifts to cover events that they cannot attend. Politicians
need money. Gift-giving is a strong Japanese tradition, especially among
those who help each other. Japanese politicians spend a lot of money giv-
ing gifts - and, like some politicians in every country, a number of them
receive gifts as bribes. Japanese companies bribe politicians in return for
profitable favors. The Recruit Scandal is one such example of a Japanese
company bribing politicians through insider trading. 3 '
Under the Japanese life-employment system, job hunting for a senior
university student is very important because it will have a critical influ-
ence on his whole life. "Recruit" magazine, published by Recruit Com-
pany, is the most popular job-hunting magazine, sponsored by thousands
of private companies. The magazine, widely read by students, gives se-
niors private company job information. The students use the magazine as
a "job hunting Bible," and it makes Recruit large profits every year. Pri-
vate companies and the Japanese government alike want the best univer-
sity graduates to join them. The two entities always compete with each
other, trying to get the best new employees. The government uses a bu-
reaucratic examination system to find the highest level of university grad-
uates, while private companies use an interview system. The government
and many private companies have an agreement that prohibits senior stu-
dents from visiting the companies for interviews before the government
examination results. However, many companies do not follow the
agreement.
In 1984, the government changed the examination schedule to better
compete with private companies, and there was a rumor that the govern-
ment was going to abolish "the agreement." Without the agreement Re-
cruit would have lost significant business.1 36 Recruit proceeded to bribe
the Chief Cabinet Secretary and other congressmen to put pressure on
the administration to follow the agreement. As Recruit was a listed com-
pany and had many shareholders, it was preferable to use the stock of its
subsidiary - Recruit Cosmos Real Estate Co. - to bribe the politicians.
When a company goes public its stock price often trades at a sub-
135. Sanger, supra note 63; Seijika Yonjuyonin Ni Shikin [Money Given to Forty-four
Politicians], ASAHI SHINBUN [NEWS], June 13, 1989, at 15, col. 2; Asano, Kawamoto,
Shibahara, Nishita, & Yasuhara, Rikuruto Jiken No Horitsu Mondai [The Legal Problem of
the Recruit Case], Zadankai [Conference], 947 JURISUTO [JURIST] 16 (1989); ISAACS, supra
note 77, at 138-39.
136. If the agreement had been broken, Recruit's sponsors would have gone out to ad-
vertise themselves as soon as possible because there would have been no time restriction.
Since these companies would not have advertised themselves at the same time, Recruit
would have lost much advertising business.
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stantial premium above the offering price. Recruit Cosmos gave confiden-
tial information to politicians regarding the company going public and
sold company stock to them to complete the bribe. Here is how it worked.
Cosmos registered its stock on the over-the-counter market on Octo-
ber 30, 1986. Before registration it sold 242,000 shares to forty-four Japa-
nese politicians at a price of 3,000 yen (25 U.S. dollars) per share. After
registration, its stock was traded on the over-the-counter market at a
price of 5,270 yen (44 U.S. dollars); then it rose to 7,250 yen (60 U.S.
dollars). The forty-four politicians sold their shares and took a total profit
of 730,000,000 yen (6 million U.S. dollars). In addition to the trading
profit, the Recruit Group also gave these politicians money donations, en-
tertainment, and other benefits such as quantity purchases of tickets for
party fund-raising events. By May of 1988, the total Recruit bribes to the
politicians, including the trade profit, was over 1,330,000,000 yen (11 mil-
lion U.S. dollars).
Prime Minister Takeshita received about 201,000,000 yen (1.7 million
U.S. dollars) during his service as Minister of Finance and later Prime
Minister. The former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abe, gained 137,000,000
yen (1.2 million U.S. dollars). The Minister of Finance, Miyazawa, re-
ceived 122,000,000 yen (1 million U.S. dollars). Former Prime Minister
Nakasone made a 110,000,000 yen profit (0.9 million U.S. dollars).
After the scandal was exposed, the politicians denied knowledge of
the stock transactions and donations because these transactions and do-
nations were executed in the names of their wives, children, aides or
others. However, all of the politicians were found to have had connection
with the plot. Most of them resigned from office and their political parties
for a period of time but subsequently were re-elected. One of the Prime
Minister's aides, Aoki, committed suicide on April 26, 1989."'
Although over twenty persons who had connections with the scandal
were prosecuted for bribery, most of them were company directors or of-
ficers. Only two congressmen and four aides of politicians were prose-
cuted. Nakasone, Takeshita, Abe, and Miyazawa were not prosecuted.
There were no prosecutions for breach of Article 157.
In another insider trading case, Meitanco Co., an electric appliance
manufacturer, announced that the company had invented a "highly effi-
137. The reason for Aoki's suicide was that this was his only way out. There is no plea-
bargain system in Japan. Even if he had testified in the Diet, no immunity to avoid prosecu-
tion would have been available. As a consequence, he would have gone to jail even if he had
testified. His family would have lost his support. By proving his loyalty to his "master" -
by committing suicide - his master became committed to the care of his family, and of
course would himself be spared the consequences of unfavorable testimony. If the aid had
betrayed his master, society would have criticized him for his disloyalty! In the Lockheed
Scandal, in which the aircraft manufacturer bribed former Prime Minister Tanaka to push
Japanese airlines to buy Lockheed products, Tanaka's driver committed suicide for the
same reasons. Lokido Jiken Nisshi [Lockheed Case Diary], 676 JURISUTO [JURIST] 169, 171
(1978).
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cient device" to save electricity, registered the device, and received a pat-
ent. The president of Meitanco bought a large stake of the company's
stock before the new invention's announcement. He also bribed politi-
cians with the company's stocks and with money. After the announce-
ment, the company's stock price soared, and the president asked "his"
politicians to speak in the Diet to push government departments to buy
the company's new device. Ironically, government test reports proved
that the new device could not save.any energy at all.138
Article 157 should apply to scandals like Recruit and Meitanco.
However, Article 157 is too vague and too broad for the Japanese legal
system. Since it has been a dead letter for over forty years, there is little
anticipation that it will be used in the future. As a result, things have not
yet changed. Although Articles 166 and 167 specifically make insider
trading unlawful, it is unlikely that Japanese courts will impose penalties
of the magnitude necessary to serve as a deterrent."3 9
Politicians (and others) also can still take advantage of public com-
panies in order to engage in insider trading. For instance, a listed com-
pany A's insider B tells C, one of politician D's aides, A company's "mate-
rial facts," and D buys A company's securities and profits. D is not
restricted by Article 166 because D is not a primary tippee. D is a second-
ary tippee. There is no insider or primary tippee penalty for passing "ma-
terial facts." As a result, if a tippee other than a primary tippee does
insider trading, no one in the scheme will be sanctioned.
It is a reasonable conclusion that Japanese politicians do not intend
to ban all insider trading. They have left seams in the net in order to
allow the astute to pass through. The politicians passed a very strict-look-
ing law in order to convince foreigners that Japan would no longer be an
"insider's haven," but at the same time they also allowed room for eva-
sion of the law. The Japanese call this "getting two birds with only one
marble."
§ 6.02 Civil Remedies and Legal Fees
It is very difficult to secure a remedy for losses resulting from insider
trading. The Securities and Exchange Law does not provide for civil lia-
bilities in insider trading. The only way for an insider trader's victim to
get a private remedy is to sue the insider in tort on the basis of Civil
Code Article 709. For example, insider A bought XYZ company's stocks
from B and made a substantial profit. B can sue A; however, B has the
burden of proof. Usually, it is very difficult to prove that A knew the
business' "material facts" through his work or duty. It is also very diffi-
cult to prove how much B lost in a fluctuating market. The Japanese law
does not recognize implied liabilities.
138. Nagaseko Ni Jikei Sannen [Nagaseko Sentenced to Three Years], ASAHI SHINBUN
[NEWS] (Yukan [ev. ed.]), May 9, 1989, at 1.
139. See supra § 4.
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A shareholder who sues an insider under Article 164 has to pay his
own legal fees. Article 164 prescribes that if a company does not ask an
insider to return his profits from insider trading, any shareholder can sue
the insider to disgorge the profits to the company on behalf of the com-
pany. However, even if the plaintiff wins he must pay the legal fees, and
profits will be returned to the company. Thus, shareholders rarely want
to sue insiders on behalf of their companies.
§ 6.03 Bureaucratic Ambivalence
There is no independent public regulator with adequate authority to
oversee the securities market in Japan. The Japanese do not have an
American-style Securities and Exchange Commission. The S.E.S.C. does
not have the bite. It can only advise or make suggestions to the Minister
of Finance. The new law appears to give the S.E.S.C. extensive power, but
actually the S.E.S.C. is still dependent upon the M.O.F. as it cannot initi-
ate any proceeding. The M.O.F. is unwilling to give power to an S.E.C.-
like independent regulator.
Another reason for the bureaucrats' failure to expose insider trading
is that personnel of the Ministry have been involved in scandals. Two
Prime Ministers and two Ministers of Finance were involved in the Re-
cruit Scandal. The fact is that when Nakasone was Prime Minister,
Takeshita was the Minister of Finance; when Takeshita became the next
Prime Minister, Miyazawa became the Minister of Finance. During these
two recent terms of cabinet both the Finance Ministers were involved in
insider trading. Ministry of Finance bureaucrats are not in the habit of
exposing their bosses..
Finally, whether the Japanese government has the mind-set to effec-
tively regulate securities markets is questionable. The Wall Street Jour-
nal, in January of 1993, reported that the Japanese government was using
"vast amounts of money from the postal system and other funds" to
purchase securities in an effort to stem "the relentless slide in the Nikkei
225-stock index."14 The Journal reported that "the objective is appar-
ently to keep stock prices high enough that banks and other corporations
with big stock portfolios won't have to declare major losses on their in-
vestments when the fiscal year ends March 31." Although the government
"officially says its intention isn't to prop up the Nikkei," the Journal cites
convincing evidence of massive purchases by the government through the
banks that largely offset the fact that institutional investors were large
net sellers during the fourth quarter of 1992. "What happens after the
critical March 31 date passes," the Journal continues, "is anyone's
guess."' " Nor is the denial by the government that it is supporting the
market credible, since it publicly announced, in August of 1992, an emer-
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gency package of economic measures that included a promise to invest
more public funds in the stock market."' 42 This was all against the con-
tinued decline during 1992 in the Nikkei and an eighty five percent re-
duction during 1992 in net purchases by international investors in securi-
ties traded on the principal Japanese stock exchanges."4
§ 7. CONCLUSION
The Japanese recently amended their Securities and Exchange Law
in order to convince foreigners that their securities market is a fair one.
Article 157 is the general anti-fraud provision, but this Article is a dead
letter because it is too vague, too broad, and has yet to be used in an
insider trading case. There is little hope that the Japanese will use this
Article in the future. Article 163 requires corporate insiders to file reports
with the Minister of Finance after they trade their company's securities.
Article 164 requires corporate insiders to disgorge profits from tainted
transactions to their companies. Article 163 (relating to the filing of in-
sider reports), while inactive for a long time, was revived in the new
amendment. Article 165 prohibits insiders from short-selling. Articles 166
and 167 are new Articles, and they look very strict on paper. Article 166
prohibits insiders, quasi-insiders, and primary tippees from insider trad-
ing in ordinary transactions, while Article 167 regulates them in tender
offers. Article 154 reinforces the right of the Minister of Finance to ex-
amine stock exchanges, and to order issuers to file reports with him. The
S.E.S.C. was created and delegated powers of the M.O.F. under this Arti-
cle to serve as a new watchdog. The S.E.S.C. is not an independent regu-
lator. Therefore, securities regulation in Japan still depends on the old
M.O.F., which has not been an effective enforcer of the laws.
The new amendments seem like a great advance in preventing insider
trading in Japanese securities markets, but they certainly have not yet
changed things to any significant degree. Insider trading has been too in-
herent in the Japanese political scene to expect Japanese politicians to
ban all insider trading. On the one hand, they have created very strict-
looking rules in order to convince foreigners that the Japanese market is
fair. On the other hand, they conveniently preserve ways that permit eva-
sions of the regulatory scheme.
There is no provision for civil liabilities against insider trading in the
Securities and Exchange Law. An insider's trade "victim" has to sue the
insider under Civil Code Article 709. The burden of proof lies with the
plaintiff, and it is very difficult to prove the amount the plaintiff lost, or
that the insider knew the "material facts" through his work or duty. If a
shareholder sues an insider for the return of profits to a company under
Article 164, that shareholder has to pay his own legal fees. As a result,
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few shareholders will sue an insider on behalf of a company. There is no
U.S.-style S.E.C. in Japan. The past involvement of certain high level
personnel of the Ministry of Finance and other politicians in insider trad-
ing, makes it unlikely that lower level bureaucrats will strive to expose
insider trading that may involve the highest levels of government. Even
the recent change of leadership in Japan, from the long-standing Liberal
Democrats to a nascent coalition, dismantles little of the historic fabric
throughout which insider trading penetrates.
Although it seems that the new law has reinforced anti-insider trad-
ing provisions, it leaves many loop-holes. The new amendments to the
Securities and Exchange Law are neither severe nor effective enough to
prevent insider trading in Japan.
